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Abstract 
Since the gender diversity of boards and reporting of earnings are two most debated issues in 
the corporate world, the paper examined how the presence of women directors on the corporate 
board influence earnings management practices. We found that firms with a higher number of 
female and independent female directors are adopting restrained earnings management 
practices in the UK. We further made a distinction between high and low debt firms, and the 
outcomes reveal that female directors have a positive effect on the earnings management in 
low debt firms. The paper contributes to the debate on gender diversity on boards, and its 
impact on the use of accounting discretion in financial reporting. 
  
Female Directors and Earnings Management: Evidence from UK companies 
 
1 .  Introduction 
The literature on board diversity and the firm financial performance (e.g. Adams et al. 2009; 
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008; Farrell and Hersch 2005; Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt et al. 
2003) broadly supports the view that the presence of women representatives on the board 
enhance the firm financial performance. The recent Davies report (2011) has provided a 
business case for gender diversity on boards based on the potential impact in improving 
performance, accessing the widest talent pool, achieving better corporate governance and being 
more responsive to the market. However, the issue of improving the gender balance of 
corporate boards has continued as worldwide concern. For instance, in the U.S, women held 
only 16.9% of Fortune 500 board seats in 2013, and less than one-fifth of companies had 25% 
or more women directors, while one-tenth had no women serving on their boards (Catalyst 
2013). The Davies Report (2011) further shows the levels of under-representation of women 
on corporate boards exists across the globe, ranging between 3.6% in industrialised Asia-
Pacific region to 23% in Sweden and Philippines; the figure for the UK has 9.6%. 
 
The flexibility in accounting standards allows managers to estimate and project accounting 
numbers different from the underlying economic conditions of a firm. For instance, under 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), managers can exercise discretion over 
accounting reported earnings to maximize the information value of firm’s earnings. Although 
this is an accepted strategy used by management in the corporate world for income smoothing, 
excessive use of this practice is detrimental to firms. Furthermore, it has been acknowledged 
that firm’s mangers may have an incentives to mainuplate accounting earnings either to 
maximize firm value or obtain some private gains at the expense of shareholders (Beneish 
2001; Christie and Zimmerman 1994). In the context of a conflict, managers exercise discretion 
over accounting earnings either to mislead shareholders about the firm’s financial performance 
or to gain some private benefits at the expense of other stakeholders (i.e. opportunistic earnings 
management) (Healy and Wahlen 1999). The adaptable behaviour by managers through 
various reporting methods and estimates reflect inaccurate reflections of the company's 
financial fundamentals, such as in the accounting scandals involving major corporations such 
as Enron and WorldCom1. In short, the argument is that earnings management reduces the 
quality of earnings because the information in the financial reports does not reflect the 
underlying economic conditions of a firm. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. The literature on female directors and earnings management, 
and the key questions are set in section 2, whereas Section 3 discusses the empirical methods. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.    
 
2 .  Female Directors and Earnings Management – the key questions 
In business contexts, women are more ethical in the workplace and less likely to engage in 
unethical behaviour to gain financial rewards (Khazanchi 1995; Betz et al. 1989). Gul et al. 
(2009) argue that not only do females demonstrate a greater risk aversion and ethical behaviour, 
but they are also better at obtaining voluntary information which may reduce information 
asymmetry between female directors and managers. Women are more cautious and less 
aggressive, than men in a variety of decision-making contexts (Byrnes et al. 1999), and are less 
likely to take risks particularly in the financial decision environment (Powell and Ansic 1997). 
There is therefore a greater likelihood of a restrained approach to earnings management (Gul 
et al. 2009). In a similar vein, Krishnan and Parsons (2008) found that the quality of earnings 
management is higher for firms with more female directors, and argued that women are likely 
to be more ethical in their judgement and behaviour than men. However, in contrast to these 
findings, Sun et al. (2011) found no evidence of the impact of female representation on audit 
committees and earnings management, while Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) found that the 
presence of female directors on the audit committee is negatively related to earnings 
management. In light of the differing views, we are enquiring into the relationship between 
female directors and earnings management in the UK. 
 
In this paper, we further examine whether the gender of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
affects the levels of earnings management. The CFOs have a strong role in companies, due to 
their primary responsibility on financial reporting. Jiang et al. (2010) found that the magnitude 
1 In many instnces, the ‘earning guidance’ prevailed in the corporate world is a high stake game where the 
management seeking to hit the targets set by analysts, based on an extensive private conversations between 
managers and analysts (Fuller and Jensen, 2010). On the basis of real world experience, one can argue that the 
opportunistic reasons for earnings management have  intentionally influenced stakeholders, with a degree of 
misinterpretation of the company performance. 
                                                          
of accruals and the likelihood of beating analyst forecasts are more sensitive to CFO equity 
incentives than to those of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Although a significant amount 
of accounting research has been devoted to testing the association between the effectiveness of 
corporate governance and audit committees on earnings management (Lin and Hwang 2010; 
Benkraiem 2009; Ebrahim 2007; Xie et al. 2003; Klein 2002), only a few studies have 
examined the association between gender diversity on the board of directors and earnings 
management. For instance, Barua et al. (2011) investigated the association between CFO 
gender and earnings management and found that firms with female CFOs have lower 
discretionary accruals than firms with male CFOs. Similar findings were provided by Peni and 
Vähämaa (2010), who examined the association between CFO and CEO gender and earnings 
management, and found that firms with female CFOs have income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals, indicating that female CFOs are following more conservative financial reporting rules 
and standards. However, they found no association between earnings management and CEO 
gender. In contrast, Gavious et al. (2012) found that companies with female CEOs have less 
earnings management than those with males, and a negative relationship between female 
executives and earnings management. Instead, Hili and Affes (2012) found no association 
between earnings management and the presence of female directors on boards and audit 
committees in French and US companies respectively. 
 
Further to this, we explore the effect of female directors on earnings management in both high 
and low debt firms. We identify high debt firms as those that rely more on debt financing, with 
larger boards and more independent directors (Coles et al. 2008; Faleye 2007). In contrast, low 
debt firms depend on firm-specific knowledge of insiders and have smaller boards with a 
greater number of insiders. The findings of pooled OLS regression reveal that a number of 
female directors on the board constrain the level of earnings management. These findings are 
consistent with the previous studies of Gavious et al. (2012); Peni and Vähämaa (2010); and 
Krishnan and Parsons (2008), who found that firms with a higher number of women on the 
board are less likely to manipulate earnings. The key research questions are:  (1) is there an 
association between the number of female directors and earnings management?; (2) is this 
relationship the same in low and high debt firms? and; (3) is there an association between CFO 
gender and earnings management?  
 
Methods 
It has been argued that managers are more likely to manage earnings through accruals since it 
is more difficult to be detected by outsiders (Kothari et al. 2005; Dechow et al. 1995; Jones 
1991). In addition, mangers can practice their discretion either on long- or short-term 
discretionary accruals to mainpluate earnings. However, Becker et al. (1998) argue that 
managers have greater discretion over current accruals than long-term ones. In this paper, we 
use the modified of Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995)2 to estimate current discretionary 
accruals. The following cross-sectional regression equation is used to estimate current 
accruals3. 
  ����/���−1 = ���[1 ���−1]⁄ + �1��[(∆����� −  ∆�����) ���−1]⁄ + ���                      (1) 
 
Where current accruals  CAit Is net income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from 
operation for firm I in year t, ∆REVit donates the change in revenue for firm i in year t, ∆RECit 
is the change in receivable for firm i in year t, and  Ait−1 Is total assets at the beginning of the 
year t for firm me. The residuals of equation 1 is current discretionary accruals.  
 
After estimating current discretionary accrual, the association between earnings management 
and the female directors on board is investigated with ordinary least squares (OLS):  
 ����� = ∝0+∝1 ������ + ∝2  ������� + ∝3 ����� + ∝4 ������ +∝5 ����� +
 ∝6 ����� + ∝7 ����� + ∝8 �������� + ∝9 ���� +∝10 ������ + ∑ ∝��−1�=1 ���������� +
 ∑ ��2011�=2005 ������ + ���                                            (2) 
 
Where CDAit Is current discretionary accruals for me in year t. The independent variables in 
the regression specification model are NFEM donates to the number of female directors on the 
board, INFEM is the number of independent female directors on the board, EXFEM donates 
to the number of executive female directors on the board, and CFO is a dummy variable equals 
one if the CFO of the firm is female; and zero otherwise.  
2 Based on the assumption that accruals are likely to result from changes in a firm’s economic conditions, Jones 
(1990) proposes a regression-based model that controls for change in revenue and depreciation. She relates  total 
accruals to the change in revenue (∆REV) and gross property, plant, and equipment (PPT) as follows: 
TAit Ait−1 =∝1 (1 Ait−1)⁄ +∝2 (∆REVit Ait−1)⁄ +∝3 (PPTit Ait−1)⁄⁄  
Given that revenue may be subject to earnings manipulation by managers (e.g. increasing sales recognition 
near year-end period), using the Jones model will remove part of discretionary accruals. In response to the 
limitation of the Jones model, Dechow et al. (1995) developed a modified version of the Jones model by 
subtracting the change in receivables (∆REC) from change in revenues (∆REV) to exclude the element in the 
change in revenue that is expected to be managed through managerial discretion. 
3 Following  the studies of Subramanyam (1996); and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), industry groups with less 
than six observations are excluded from the sample. 
                                                          
 We use control variables in the model for firm-specific characteristics that may affect the level 
earnings management. These control variables are: SIZEit measured as the natural logartim of 
total assets for firm i in year t, OCFit Is net operating cash flow divided by total assets, ROAit 
is return on assets, LEVit Is  financial leverage  measured as total liabilities scaled by total 
assets, GSALESit is the sales growing ratio, MBit is market to book value, and LOSSit Is a 
dummy variable taking one if the firm i reported negative net income in year t; and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Previous studies suggested that the above firm-specific characteristics are useful to predict 
earnings management (Kim et al. 2012; Hong and Andersen 2011; Chih et al. 2008). SIZE is 
included in the regression to control for the potintal impact of firm size on the earnings 
management. There is no agreement in the literature regarding the effect of firm size on 
earnings management. For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue that  larger 
companies are more likely to perform income-decreasing earnings management. In contrast, 
Richardson (2000) indicates that the market pressure is greater for larger companies because 
they are subject to close scrutiny by investors, thus more likely to adopt aggressive accounting 
policies which lead to manage earnings management upwards. Therefore, firm size can be 
negative or positive associated with earnings management. OCF was included to control for 
the differences of performance across firms within different industries and economic activity 
on earnings management. The studies by Gul et al. (2009); and Dechow et al. (1995) find that 
firms with a high operational cash flow are less likely to engage to income-incresing earnings 
management because they are already performing well. In line with the previous studies, we 
expect that firms with a high cash flow performance are less likely to engage in income-
increasing earnings management. ROA is proxy for firm financial performance, and expected 
that the firms with higher financial performance tend to manage earnings downwards (Watts 
and Zimmerman 1990). LEV is used as proxy for debt covenant violation (Elayan et al. 2008). 
The findings of the impact of LEV on earnings management were mixed (Dechow and Skinner 
2000; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Watts and Zimmerman 1990). Therefore, financial 
leverage can be negative or positive associated with earnings management. GSALES and MB 
are included to control for a firm growth. It is expected that firms with high growth tend to 
manage discretionary accruals upwards due to they are under the greatest pressure to adopt 
aggressive accounting policies to report increased earnings (Chih et al. 2008). Loss is included 
to control for financial condition of the firm and expected that firms that faced financial 
problems tend to engage in income-decreasing earnings management (Healy 1985). The extent 
of earnings management which may differ over time and across industries, we control for time 
and potential industry effect. INDUSTRY in equation 2 is a dummy variable according to 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) and YEAR is a dummy variable that indicate fiscal 
years.     
 
Our initial sample of this study is UK FTSE 350 index during the period from 2005-2011. 
However, we have removed the categories of regulated, mining, and financial industries due to 
their unique characteristics and specific regulations which may affect the results (Klein 2002; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). In addition, as in the case of prior studies of Subramanyam 
(1996); and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), industries with less than six observations and the 
firms with missing data were also reduced from the initial sample. The final sample consists of 
1217 firm-year observation during the study period. Table I summarises the distribution of the 
final sample in accordance to Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) classification. 
 
  
Table I: Final Sample Classified by Industry 
ICB  Industries 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
0500 Oil & Gas 12 13 13 14 13 16 16 97 
2700 Industrial Goods & Services 54 56 56 56 57 57 54 390 
3500 Food & Beverage 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 77 
3700 Personal & Household Goods 10 12 12 13 13 13 13 86 
4500 Health Care 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 56 
5300 Retail 18 20 24 25 25 25 25 162 
5500 Media 7 8 9 9 9 9 10 61 
5700 Travel & Leisure 20 20 21 21 22 22 22 148 
6500 Telecommunications 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 42 
9500 Technology 13 14 15 15 15 15 14 101 
Total 159 168 175 178 179 182 179 1220 
 
Three main resources were used to collect the data, mainly FAME, Thomson One Banker, and 
firms’ annual reports. Earnings management and control variables were collected mainly from 
FAME and Thomson One Banker databases, while Female director variables were gathered 
from firms’ annual reports.  
3 .  Empirical Findings 
As can be seen from Table II, the mean  value of current discretionary accruals (CDA) 
measured by modified Jones model is -0.020.The findings indicate that UK companies, on 
average, tend to be conservative and prefer to engage in income-decreasing (negative) earnings 
management. Regarding female directors on the board, Table II shows that the median number 
of female directors on the board is 1 and the maximum number is 4 directors. This results are 
consistent with the previous study of Gavious et al. (2012) who find the average number of 
female directors on the board in Israel companies is 1 and the maximum is 5. The median of 
independent female directors on the board is 0 and the maximum number is 3. Table II also 
reports descriptive statistics for various firm-specific variables and shows that the mean 
company’s log total assets are 3.109, and the mean CFO is 12 percent of total assets. The mean 
ROA is around 10 percent of total assets, and financial leverage is 5.9 percent of total assets. 
The rate of annual GSALES is 2 percent, and MB value is £3.5 million. It shows that around 9 
per cent of the companies reported negative earnings in their financial statements during the 
given period.  
 
 
  
Table II: Descriptive Statistics  
 Mean Min P50 Max Sd. 
CDA -0.020 -0.788 -0.018 0.805 0.076 
NFAM 0.813 0.000 1.000 4.000 0.932 
INFAM 0.392 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.632 
FCO 0.028 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.165 
size 3.109 1.318 3.047 5.341 0.673 
OCF 0.120 -0.347 0.103 1.461 0.108 
ROA 0.097 -0.544 0.081 1.341 0.125 
LEV 0.592 -0.100 0.599 1.319 0.211 
GSALES 0.212 -0.774 0.102 8.341 0.569 
MB 3.504 -0.387 2.657 25.055 3.233 
LOSS 0.092 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.289 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using modfid Jones model; NFAM= Number of femal director on the board; 
INFAM = Number of independent femal director on the board; FCO = Dummy variable equals 1 if the CFO of 
the firm is female; and 0 otherwise;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total assets; OCF = 
Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio; LEV = Financial 
leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = Growing sales;  MB = Market-to-book 
ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss; and 0 otherwise. 
 
Recently, the UK companies have become more responsive to the demand for a gender 
balanced board. This gradual shift in recognising the role of female in the corporate board was 
evident in Grosvold et al. (2007) which noticed the presence of female directors in UK FTSE 
100 companies raised from 4.5 per cent in 1999 to 10.5 per cent in 2005. Table III  
shows the highest propotion of NFAM (12 per cent) and INFAM (6 per cent) in 2011. However, 
with respect to FCO, Table III shows that the highest number of FCO is 7 in 2008 and the 
lowest is 3 in 2009, which indicates inconsistent trends.  
 
Table IV shows that the highest correlation is between the number of female directors on the 
board and the number of independent female directors with a coefficient of 59 per cent and 
significant at 1 per cent level. According to Gujarati (2003), the coefficient of ±80 percent is 
considered as a begging at which multicollinearity problem might exist and harm the results of 
the regression analysis. Therefore, the problem of multicollinearity does not exist between the 
independent variables of this paper. 
               Table III: The number and the propotion of female on the boards classified by the year 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Board Size 1484 1563 1610 1654 1631 1652 1681 11275 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
NFAM 97 0.065 117 0.075 131 0.081 138 0.083 141 0.086 157 0.095 209 0.124 990 0.088 
INFAM 41 0.028 51 0.033 62 0.039 64 0.039 73 0.045 80 0.048 106 0.063 477 0.042 
FCE 3 0.002 6 0.004 5 0.003 7 0.004 3 0.002 4 0.002 6 0.004 34 0.003 
NFAM= Number of femal director on the board; INFAM = Number of independent femal director on the board; FCE= Dummy variable equals 1 if the CFO of the 
firm is female; and 0 otherwise 
 
Table III: Correlation Matrix 
Variable A B C D E F G H I J K 
A CDA 1.000           
B NFAM -0.030 1.000          
C INFAM -0.028 0.587*** 1.000         
D FCO 0.007 0.312*** 0.037 1.000        
E Firm size -0.186*** 0.296*** 0.222*** -0.022 1.000       
F OCF -0.301*** 0.085** 0.010 0.032 -0.127*** 1.000      
G ROA 0.162*** 0.028 -0.040 0.025 -0.097*** 0.455*** 1.000     
H LEV -0.199*** 0.062* 0.039 -0.070* 0.282*** 0.054 -0.017 1.000    
I GSALES 0.005 -0.024 -0.112*** 0.021 -0.208*** -0.041 -0.006 -0.133*** 1.000   
J MB -0.032 -0.017 -0.036 0.011 -0.035 0.195*** 0.216*** 0.266*** -0.089** 1.000  
K LOSS -0.177*** 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.042 -0.236*** -0.299*** 0.034 0.101*** -0.121*** 1.000 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using modfid Jones model; NFAM= Number of femal director on the board; INFAM = Number of independent femal director 
on the board; FCO = Dummy variable equals 1 if the CFO of the firm is female; and 0 otherwise;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total assets; 
OCF = Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio; LEV = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to 
total assets ratio;  GSALES = Growing sales;  MB = Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss; and 0 otherwise. 
 
The estimation results of our pooled ordinary least squars (OLS) regressions are presented in 
Table V.  The adjusted R2 of the estimated models are varying between 29.8 and 30.3 percent. 
Th lower levels of adjusted R2 are normal in this type of accruals regression models (Gavious 
et al. 2012; Srinidhi et al. 2011; Sun et al. 2011). The main independent variables in our models 
are the number of females (NFAM) and independent female directors (INFAM) on the board 
as well as CFO director variables. As can be noticed from Table V, the coefficints of female 
variables are  consistently positive in all four regression specifications. Although, the results 
show that NFAM and INFAM are positively significant at 0.05 and 0.10 respectively related 
to earnings management, we do not observe any significant association between CFO and 
earnings management. Recall from the descrptive statistics results in Table II, the mean value 
of current discretionary accruals (CDA) is negative (-0.020), thereby the results in Table V 
suggest that firms with female directors and independent female directors on the boards may 
tend to be more conservative and more likely to practice income-decreasing earnings 
management. These findings are consistent with the study of Gavious et al. (2012) who find 
that Israel firms with female and independent female dirctors on the boards are more like to 
engage in less earnings management. Peni and Vähämaa (2010)  found that the presence of 
female executives in the US companies is associated with income-decreasing earnings 
management. Our results also confirmed this trend, but further show that CFO manager does 
not impact the practise of earnings management. 
The results in Table V suggests that the gender of the firm dierctors may impact the quality of 
financial reports. The regression estimates indicate that firms with higher number of female 
and independent females directors are more likely to practice conservative financial reporting 
policies and tend to practice income-decreasing earnings management practices compared to 
their counterparts of those firms with lower number of female and independent female 
directors4. Thus, it can be reasonable to argue that the precence of female directors on the board 
may mitigate income-increasing earnings management. Although the coefficient of female 
FCO is consistently positive, the female FCO director seems not to have any statistically 
significant effect on earnings management. Thus, the findings provide empirical evidence on 
the significant impact of femals on the boards on the quality of financial reporting. 
4 These findings are consistent with the pervious gender literature in conservatism and income-decreasing 
earnings management (Gavious et al. 2012; Peni and Vähämaa 2010; Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998; Johnson 
and Powell 1994). 
                                                          
Table IV: Regression results upon on the number of female directors on the board 
CDA Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept ? 0.093*** (9.566) 
0.093*** 
(9.594) 
0.095*** 
(9.630) 
0.093*** 
(9.563) 
0.095*** 
(9.661) 
NFAM +  0.006** (2.329)   
0.007** 
(2.419) 
INFAM +   0.004* (1.833)  
0.004* 
(1.887) 
FCO +    0.004 (0.510) 
-0.007 
(-0.861) 
Size + -0.024*** (-11.287) 
-0.024*** 
(-11.388) 
-0.025*** 
(-11.307) 
-0.024*** 
(-11.278) 
-0.025*** 
(-11.418) 
OCF + -0.267*** (-12.757) 
-0.269*** 
(-13.107) 
-0.269*** 
(-12.858) 
-0.267*** 
(-12.743) 
-0.271*** 
(-13.236) 
ROA ? 0.097*** (4.897) 
0.095*** 
4.863 
0.098*** 
(4.931) 
0.097*** 
(4.899) 
0.095*** 
(4.885) 
LEV ? -0.033*** (-4.411) 
-0.033*** 
(-4.492) 
-0.033*** 
(-4.425) 
-0.033*** 
(-4.382) 
-0.034*** 
(-4.554) 
GSALES ? -0.004 (-1.354) 
-0.004 
(-1.424) 
-0.003 
(-1.319) 
-0.004 
(-1.383) 
-0.004 
(-1.355) 
MB ? 0.001 (0.044) 
0.001 
(0.164) 
0.001 
(0.084) 
0.001 
(0.035) 
0.001 
(0.245) 
LOSS ? -0.035*** (-6.001) 
-0.035*** 
(-6.094) 
-0.035*** 
(-5.980) 
-0.035*** 
(-6.006) 
-0.035*** 
(-6.071) 
Industry  included included included included Included 
Year  included included included included Included 
Observations  1217 1217 1217 1217 1217 
Adjusted R2  0.298 0.301 0.299 0.298 0.303 
F-Value  21.850*** 21.850*** 20.820*** 20.870*** 20.640*** 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using modified Jones model; NFAM= Number of female director on the 
board; INFAM = Number of independent female director on the board; FCO = Dummy variable equals 1 if the 
CFO of the firm is female; and 0 otherwise;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total assets; 
OCF = Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio; LEV = 
Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = Growing sales;  MB = 
Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss; and 0 otherwise. 
 
The previous regression specification models are based on the number of female and 
independent female directors and indicate that firms with female and independent female 
directors are associated with conservative and income-decreasing financial reporting. To 
provide reasonable assurance that the preliminary results in Table V are constant and robust to 
the specifications of different measures, we use the proportion of femal directors (PFAM) and 
independent female directors (PIFAM) as alternative measure of the presence of female 
director on the boards to examine wheter the association between females on the boards and 
and earnings management is affected by using different measures of females. To doing so, we 
use the propotion of femals on the boards as an alternative meseaure to the number of femals. 
Recall from the previous discussion, the female FCO variable is a dummy variable that take 
value 1 if the FCO is female director, and 0 otherwise.  
As can be seen from Table VI, the coefficints of female variables are  consistently positive in 
all four regression specifications and that the propotion of females and independent females 
are statically significant at 0.05 and 0.10 percent. Howerver, the coefficient of female FCO 
dummy variable is positive, it not does not reveal any significant association with earnings 
management. These results is in line with the previous findings, indicating that firms with 
females tend to be more conservation and more likely to practice income-decreasing earnings 
management. However, theses results reveal that the presence of female FCO does not impact 
the direction of earnings management.  
In light of the obove, the results in Table VI are consistent and robust to the different meseaurs 
of female dirctors on the boards and that the associaction between females and earnings 
management is not affected by the differents measures of females.   
Table VI: Regression results upon on the proportion of female directors on the board 
CDA Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept ? 0.093*** 
9.566 
0.092*** 
9.519 
0.094*** 
9.678 
0.093*** 
9.563 
0.094*** 
9.627 
PFAM +  0.058** 
2.219 
  0.070** 
2.335 
PIFAM +   0.038* 
1.933 
 0.039* 
2.004 
FCO 
+    0.004 
0.510 
-0.007 
-0.936 
Size + -0.024*** 
-11.287 
-0.024*** 
-11.196 
-0.025*** 
-11.396 
-0.024*** 
-11.278 
-0.025*** 
-11.312 
OCF + -0.267*** 
-12.757 
-0.268*** 
-13.015 
-0.269*** 
-12.882 
-0.267*** 
-12.743 
-0.270*** 
-13.157 
ROA ? 0.097*** 
4.897 
0.095*** 
4.868 
0.098*** 
4.947 
0.097*** 
4.899 
0.096*** 
4.907 
LEV ? -0.033*** 
-4.411 
-0.034*** 
-4.503 
-0.033*** 
-4.437 
-0.033*** 
-4.382 
-0.034*** 
-4.585 
GSALES ? -0.004 
-1.354 
-0.004 
-1.407 
-0.003 
-1.298 
-0.004 
-1.383 
-0.003 
-1.310 
MB ? 0.001 
0.044 
0.001 
0.152 
0.001 
0.125 
0.001 
0.035 
0.001 
0.278 
LOSS ? -0.035*** 
-6.001 
-0.035*** 
-6.082 
-0.035*** 
-5.990 
-0.035*** 
-6.006 
-0.035*** 
-6.068 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 
Adjusted R2  0.298 0.301 0.3 0.298 0.303 
F-Value  20.690*** 21.850*** 22.180*** 20.940*** 20.870*** 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using modified Jones model; PFAM= Proportion of female director on 
the board; PINFAM = Proportion of independent female director on the board; FCO = Dummy variable equals 
1 if the CFO of the firm is female; and 0 otherwise;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total 
assets; OCF = Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio; 
LEV = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = Growing sales;  MB 
= Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss; and 0 otherwise. 
 
To investigate whether the firm characteristics impact the association between females on the 
board and earnings management, we divided the pooled sample into two subset of data 
according to the leverage median. The first data set comprises firms that have leverage above 
the median and is identified as “High debt firms”. Meanwhile, the second data set comprises 
firms with leverage below the median and is identified as “Low debt firms”. To test whether 
the board size and number of female directors is statically difference from zero in High and 
Low debt firms, we applied univariate tests using T-test. The results of univariate tests are 
presented in Table VII which shows that the mean of board size for High debt firms is larger 
than its counterpart of Low debt firms and the mean difference is statistically significant at 0.05 
percent level5. This result is in line Coles et al. (2008); and Faleye (2007) who argue that High 
debt firms have larger boards compared with Low debt firms. However, the female FCO is 
significantly different from zero at 0.05 percent level for High and Low debt firms which shows 
that the precence of female FCO director in Low debt firms is higher than its counterparts of 
those companies of High debt firms. Table VII indicate that the mean of current discretionary 
accruals (CAD) is significantly different from zero at 0.01 percent and that the mean value of 
5 The board size variable is not of our interesting and the aim of showing it is to provide 
evidence of whether the mean of board size is significantly different form zero for High and 
Low debt firms as well as to show whether High debt firms have lager or smaller boards 
compared to Low debt firms. 
                                                          
CAD in High debt firms is –0.031 compared to -0.009 in Low debt firms. This result suggests 
that High debt firms are more likely to engage in income-decreasing earnings management 
compared to Low debt firms. While the means of cash flow from operation (CFO), return on 
assets ratio (ROA) and losses (LOSS) are not statistically significant at any level, the 
differences between the means of firm size (Size), leverage (LEV), growing sales (GSALES) 
and Market-to-book ratio (MB) are ranged from 0.01 to 0.05 percent.  
 
Table VII: Univariate analysis  
Variable High debt firms Low debt firms T-test 
 Mean Sd. Mean Sd.  
CDA -0.031 0.077 -0.009 0.073 5.022*** 
Board Size 9.464 2.460 9.066 2.389 -2.864** 
NFAM 0.865 0.899 0.762 0.962 -1.934* 
INFAM 0.428 0.668 0.356 0.593 -1.970* 
FCO 0.013 0.114 0.043 0.202 3.136** 
Size 3.229 0.639 2.990 0.769 -8.392*** 
OCF 0.122 0.092 0.116 0.098 -1.066 
ROA 0.093 0.120 0.100 0.130 0.867 
LEV 0.756 0.138 0.428 0.127 -43.081*** 
GSALES 0.149 0.371 0.275 0.708 3.900*** 
MB 4.283 3.951 2.726 2.025 -8.654** 
LOSS 0.099 0.298 0.085 0.280 -0.802 
 
Furthermore, we examined the question on whether the role of female dirctors on the boards to 
constrain manipulate earnings through accruals is affected by the firm characteristics. The 
estimation results are presented in Table VIII. The estimates are presented in two panels: Panel 
A reports the results for High debt firms, while Panel B presents the results for Low debt firms. 
As can be seen in Panel A, the number of female, independent female dirctors as well as a 
dummy femal FCO variable in High debt firms do not impact the earnings management. 
However, in Panel B, shows that the number of females and independent female on the board 
in Low debt firms are positively significant related to earnings management at 0.01 percent. 
These results indicate that female and independent female directors on the boards in Low debt 
firms are more likely to be more conservative and engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management. The possible explanation of these findings is that High debt firms should have 
larger boards compared to Low debt firms and that the former could be less effective than the 
later (Coles et al. 2008). Therefore, the role of female director might be more effective where 
they work on the smaller boards. In both groups, there is no evidence on the association 
between female CFO and the level of earnings management.  
The results in Table VIII show that the number of female directors in Low debt firms is 
following more conservative financial reporting policies and manipulate earnings dwonwords 
than their counterparts of those firms with low number of females. On the other hand, the 
number of female dirctors in High debt firms does not show any significant association related 
to the level of earnings management. Given that Low debt firms have smaller boards than High 
debt firms, the results of this study is in line with the argument of that smaller boards are more 
effective than larger (Coles et al. 2008). Regrarding to the role of females on the boards in 
constraining earnings management, the results that the the role of female director on the smaller 
boards is more effective compared to the larger boards. 
Table VIII: High and Low debt Firms results using number of female directors 
CDA Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Panel A: High debt firms 
Intercept ? 0.107*** 
5.376 
0.108*** 
5.420 
0.107*** 
5.368 
0.107*** 
5.351 
0.108*** 
5.382 
NFAM + 
 
0.005 
1.098 
  0.005 
1.124 
INFAM + 
 
 0.001 
-0.132 
 0.001 
-0.071 
FCO + 
 
  -0.003 
-0.389 
-0.006 
-0.719 
Size + -0.028*** 
-7.819 
-0.028*** 
-7.868 
-0.028*** 
-7.764 
-0.028*** 
-7.805 
-0.028*** 
-7.803 
OCF + -0.242*** 
-7.772 
-0.245*** 
-8.023 
-0.242*** 
-7.757 
-0.242*** 
-7.767 
-0.245*** 
-8.026 
ROA ? 0.079*** 
3.269 
0.078*** 
3.270 
0.079*** 
3.258 
0.079*** 
3.265 
0.078*** 
3.258 
LEV ? -0.054*** 
-3.765 
-0.055*** 
-3.814 
-0.054*** 
-3.765 
-0.054*** 
-3.748 
-0.055*** 
-3.793 
GSALES ? -0.003 
-0.378 
-0.003 
-0.425 
-0.003 
-0.382 
-0.003 
-0.379 
-0.003 
-0.431 
MB ? 0.000 
-0.018 
0.001 
0.091 
0.001 
-0.023 
0.001 
-0.019 
0.001 
0.094 
LOSS ? -0.037*** 
-4.596 
-0.037*** 
-4.528 
-0.037*** 
-4.599 
-0.037*** 
-4.592 
-0.037*** 
-4.520 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  608 608 608 608 608 
R-squared  0.273 0.274 0.273 0.273 0.274 
F-Value  11.210 11.330 10.720 10.770 10.500 
Panel B: Low debt firms 
Intercept ? 0.091*** 
6.398 
0.091*** 
6.472 
0.096*** 
6.611 
0.091*** 
6.410 
0.097*** 
6.711 
NFAM + 
 
0.009** 
2.435 
  0.012*** 
2.660 
INFAM + 
 
 0.008** 
2.562 
 0.008*** 
2.679 
FCO + 
 
  0.008 -0.011 
0.910 -0.934 
Size + -0.021*** 
-7.244 
-0.022*** 
-7.385 
-0.024*** 
-7.512 
-0.022*** 
-7.247 
-0.024*** 
-7.706 
OCF + -0.289*** 
-10.150 
-0.291*** 
-10.427 
-0.291*** 
-10.315 
-0.290*** 
-10.180 
-0.293*** 
-10.597 
ROA ? 0.116*** 
3.583 
0.112*** 
3.545 
0.116*** 
3.556 
0.117*** 
3.588 
0.110*** 
3.466 
LEV ? -0.036*** 
-2.258 
-0.036** 
-2.306 
-0.035** 
-2.203 
-0.035** 
-2.210 
-0.037** 
-2.297 
GSALES ? -0.004 
-1.561 
-0.005 
-1.724 
-0.004 
-1.526 
-0.005 
-1.681 
-0.004 
-1.623 
MB ? 0.001 
0.355 
0.001 
0.345 
0.001 
0.361 
0.001 
0.286 
0.001 
0.429 
LOSS ? -0.032*** 
-3.541 
-0.033*** 
-3.767 
-0.032*** 
-3.595 
-0.032*** 
-3.545 
-0.034*** 
-3.875 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  609 609 609 609 609 
R-squared  0.323 0.330 0.330 0.325 0.338 
F-Value  10.490 10.850 10.300 10.160 10.430 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using modified Jones model; NFAM= Number of female director on the 
board; INFAM = Number of independent female director on the board; FCO = Dummy variable equals 1 if 
the CFO of the firm is female; and 0 otherwise;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total 
assets; OCF = Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio; 
LEV = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = Growing sales;  MB 
= Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss; and 0 otherwise. 
 
In addition to the numbers,  we use the propotion of females as an alternative measure (see 
appendix A), and the results are consistant to the results in Table VIII. Further to this, we 
examined the robustness of the preliminary results in Table V, using Jones (1991) model as an 
alternative meseaure of earnings management to investigate whether alternative measures of 
current discretionary accruals impacts the primary results presented in Table V or not.  
 
The equation of Jones model is estimate as follows: 
CAit/Ait−1 = βit(1 Ait−1)⁄ + β1it (∆REVit Ait−1)⁄ + εit                                          (3) 
 
As can be seen from Table X, the findings are consistent with the main results in Table V, 
suggesting that the main findings are robust with different measurement of earnings 
management.  
Table X: Regression Results upon on the number of female Using Jones Model 
CA Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept ? 0.049*** 
4.824 
0.049*** 
4.863 
0.052*** 
5.000 
0.049*** 
4.837 
0.052*** 
5.040 
NFAM + 
 
0.007** 
2.353   
0.007** 
2.041 
INFAM + 
  
0.005** 
2.117  
0.005** 
2.129 
FCO +    0.010 1.374 
0.001 
0.030 
Size + -0.010*** 
-4.402 
-0.010*** 
-4.480 
-0.011*** 
-4.647 
-0.010*** 
-4.401 
-0.011*** 
-4.716 
OCF + -0.272*** 
-11.830 
-0.274*** 
-12.199 
-0.274*** 
-11.929 
-0.272*** 
-11.838 
-0.277*** 
-12.292 
ROA ? 0.102*** 
4.766 
0.100*** 
4.746 
0.103*** 
4.811 
0.102*** 
4.771 
0.101*** 
4.795 
LEV ? -0.027*** 
-3.134 
-0.027*** 
-3.226 
-0.027*** 
-3.151 
-0.026*** 
-3.065 
-0.027*** 
-3.246 
GSALES ? -0.002 
-0.691 
-0.002 
-0.766 
-0.002 
-0.644 
-0.002 
-0.753 
-0.002 
-0.721 
MB ? 0.001 
0.783 
0.001 
0.908 
0.001 
0.833 
0.001 
0.758 
0.001 
0.960 
LOSS ? -0.035*** 
-5.436 
-0.035*** 
-5.514 
-0.035*** 
-5.411 
-0.035*** 
-5.450 
-0.035*** 
-5.486 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 
R-squared  0.229 0.233 0.232 0.23 0.235 
F-Value  11.670*** 12.300*** 11.140*** 11.220*** 11.280*** 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using Jones model; NFAM= Number of female director on the board; 
INFAM = Number of independent female director on the board; FCO = Dummy variable equals 1 if the CFO 
of the firm is female; and 0 otherwise;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total assets; OCF 
= Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio; LEV = 
Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = Growing sales;  MB = 
Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss; and 0 otherwise. 
 
Furthermore, we re-estimate all the privous regressions in Table X by using the propotion of 
femal directors as an alternative meseaure of female directors on the boards. The results (see 
appendix B) are similar to the findings presented in Table X, suggesting that the main results 
in this paper are consistent and robust to the different measures of females and current 
discretionary accruals.  
 
Pooled OLS regression is used in the main analysis to predict the relationship between female 
directors on the board and earnings management. In order to test the robustness of the main 
result, we apply pooled OLS with robust regression as an alternative regression estimator, 
which show the similar results as the primary findings. Fourth, the findings of Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance tests reveal that the highest value of VIF is for ROA with 
1.37, which is lower than the critical value of 10 (Gujarati 2003, p.339). This result indicates 
that our model does not suffer from the multicollinearity issue. Finally, we test whether there 
are any heteroscedasticity issues in our analysis. The Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test 
reveals that the test statistic is insignificant, which indicates that the heteroscedasticity is less 
likely to be a substantive issue in our model.   
4 .  Conclusion 
 
In this study, we investigated the link between female directors and earnings management 
practices in the UK. The findings show that the firms with higher numbers of female and 
independent female directors tend to adopt more conservative accounting policies compared 
with those companies with lower numbers of female and independent female directors. In other 
words, this research finds that managers in the firms with higher numbers of female and 
independent female directors prefer to engage in income-decreasing rather than income-
increasing earnings management. We then examined whether this relationship exists in 
different type of company. However, the results indicate that the female directors on the board 
in High debt firms do not impact the levels of earnings management. In the Low debt firms, 
we found that the number of females and independent females on the board are positively 
related to earnings management, indicating that firms in the Low debt group with high numbers 
of female and independent female directors tend to be more conservative than companies with 
low numbers of females and independent females on their boards. As in the case of High debt 
firms, we noted that CFO Director does not impact the practice of earnings management. 
 
The use of accounting discretion, to make adjustments in financial statements is a big game 
which distorts corporate decision making itself. The paper adds to this debate, particularly on 
the relationship between female representation on corporate boards and earning management 
practices. We have aimed to include all the key characteristics in the model, and carried out 
robustness checks to ensure the rigour of the results. However, the sample consists of very 
large publicly traded companies, and the findings of the study should be interpreted on this 
basis. Since female representation is limited on corporate boards, their actual influence on 
earnings management may also be limited, but this provides yet another argument for our 
distant dream of gender-balanced corporate boards. 
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Appendix A: 
High and Low debt firms results using the propotion of female directors 
CDA Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Panel A: High debt firms 
Intercept ? 0.100*** 
7.263 
0.100*** 
7.292 
0.102*** 
7.284 
0.100*** 
7.241 
0.102*** 
7.315 
PFAM +  0.074 
1.900 
  0.080 
1.565 
PINFAM +   0.032 
0.994 
 0.035 
1.083 
FCO +    0.012 1.115 
-0.002 
-0.142 
Size + -
0.026*** 
-7.726 
-0.026*** 
-7.737 
-0.027*** 
-7.737 
-0.026*** 
-7.678 
-0.026*** 
-7.763 
OCF + -
0.261*** 
-9.153 
-0.263*** 
-9.419 
-0.263*** 
-9.226 
-0.261*** 
-9.173 
-0.266*** 
-9.527 
ROA ? 0.091*** 
3.748 
0.089*** 
3.702 
0.091*** 
3.758 
0.091*** 
3.773 
0.089*** 
3.692 
LEV ? -
0.033*** 
-2.806 
-0.033*** 
-2.837 
-0.034*** 
-2.827 
-0.032*** 
-2.727 
-0.034*** 
-2.844 
GSALES ? -0.004 
-1.342 
-0.004 
-1.407 
-0.004 
-1.297 
-0.004 
-1.390 
-0.004 
-1.355 
MB ? 0.001 
0.015 
0.001 
0.152 
0.001 
0.050 
0.001 
-0.007 
0.001 
0.205 
LOSS ? -
0.029*** 
-3.195 
-0.030*** 
-3.293 
-0.030*** 
-3.208 
-0.030*** 
-3.235 
-0.031*** 
-3.305 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  609 609 609 609 609 
R-squared  0.259 0.264 0.260 0.261 0.265 
F-Value  10.290 10.780 9.810 9.930 9.890 
Panel B: Low debt firms 
Intercept ? 0.093*** 
6.002 
0.092*** 
5.893 
0.095*** 
6.154 
0.093*** 
5.997 
0.094*** 
6.017 
PNFAM +  0.038* 
1.933 
  0.039* 
2.004 
PINFAM +   0.045* 
1.792 
 0.047* 
1.866 
FCO +    -0.005 
-0.613 
-0.013 
-1.329 
Size + -0.024*** 
-8.402 
-0.024*** 
-8.313 
-0.025*** 
-8.627 
-0.024*** 
-8.391 
-0.025*** 
-8.500 
OCF + -0.294*** 
-8.851 
-0.295*** 
-8.901 
-0.296*** 
-8.916 
-0.293*** 
-8.818 
-0.296*** 
-8.959 
ROA ? 0.096*** 
2.746 
0.095*** 
2.748 
0.099*** 
2.844 
0.096*** 
2.742 
0.098*** 
2.848 
LEV ? -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.034*** 
-3.456 -3.509 -3.471 -3.487 -3.608 
GSALES ? 0.012 
0.618 
0.011 
0.560 
0.012 
0.668 
0.012 
0.641 
0.012 
0.654 
MB ? 0.001 
0.213 
0.001 
0.219 
0.001 
0.329 
0.001 
0.224 
0.001 
0.369 
LOSS ? -0.041*** 
-5.239 
-0.041*** 
-5.292 
-0.040*** 
-5.118 
-0.041*** 
-5.226 
-0.040*** 
-5.158 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  608 608 608 608 608 
R-squared  0.367 0.368 0.370 0.367 0.372 
F-Value  14.580 14.380 14.250 14.220 14.390 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using modified Jones model; PFAM= Proportion of female director on 
the board; PINFAM = Proportion of independent female director on the board; FCO = Dummy variable 
equals 1 if the CFO of the firm is female; and 0 otherwise;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural 
logarithm of total assets; OCF = Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm performance as measured by net revenue 
to total assets ratio; LEV = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = 
Growing sales;  MB = Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss; and 0 otherwise. 
 
  
Appendix B 
Table XI: Regression Results upon on the proportion of female Using Jones Model 
CA Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept ? 0.049*** 
4.824 
0.049*** 
4.791 
0.051*** 
4.953 
0.049*** 
4.837 
0.050*** 
4.923 
PFAM +  0.056** 
2.043 
  0.054* 
1.714 
PIFAM +   0.043** 
2.045 
 0.044** 
2.037 
FCO +    0.010 
1.374 
0.001 
0.139 
REVLW + -0.010*** 
-4.402 
-0.010*** 
-4.337 
-0.011*** 
-4.589 
-0.010*** 
-4.401 
-0.011*** 
-4.529 
OCF + -0.272*** 
-11.830 
-0.273*** 
-12.063 
-0.274*** 
-11.946 
-0.272*** 
-11.838 
-0.276*** 
-12.165 
ROA ? 0.102*** 
4.766 
0.101*** 
4.747 
0.104*** 
4.824 
0.102*** 
4.771 
0.102*** 
4.808 
LEV ? -0.027*** 
-3.134 
-0.027*** 
-3.222 
-0.027*** 
-3.165 
-0.026*** 
-3.065 
-0.028*** 
-3.241 
GSALES ? -0.002 
-0.691 
-0.002 
-0.738 
-0.002 
-0.625 
-0.002 
-0.753 
-0.002 
-0.678 
MB ? 0.001 
0.783 
0.001 
0.878 
0.001 
0.869 
0.001 
0.758 
0.001 
0.960 
LOSS ? -0.035*** 
-5.436 
-0.035*** 
-5.490 
-0.035*** 
-5.420 
-0.035*** 
-5.450 
-0.035*** 
-5.471 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  1217 1217 1217 1217 1217 
R-squared  0.229 0.232 0.232 0.230 0.23 
F-Test  11.670*** 12.030*** 11.200*** 11.220*** 11.080*** 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using modified Jones model; PFAM= Proportion of female director on 
the board; PINFAM = Proportion of independent female director on the board; FCO = Dummy variable equals 
1 if the CFO of the firm is female; and 0 otherwise;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total 
assets; OCF = Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio; 
LEV = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = Growing sales;  MB 
= Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss; and 0 otherwise. 
 
